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U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND ITS EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION: SUBAFILMS, LTD. v. MGM-PATHE
COMMUNICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
As technology advances, the stage for the communication and dis-
semination of original works expands. In growing numbers, United
States citizens who produce works which are protected by copyrights
no longer limit their audience to the United States. They consider the
global community to be their audience. As a result, they must either
rely on U.S. copyright laws to protect their works outside the United
States or on laws of other countries. The Internet provides an interna-
tional electronic forum for exchanging information, and it presents an
array of copyright problems. The copyright issues surrounding the In-
ternet are far from settled. They will keep the reach of U.S. copyright
protection in the forefront as the global communications community
debates, and eventually resolves, these issues.
This paper will discuss the reasons for granting copyright protec-
tion, the protection provided by U.S. copyright laws, the extraterritorial
reach of those laws, and the alternatives available to creators who are
not protected by the U.S. laws. The recent Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals case Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications1 will be
discussed in detail and used as an example to demonstrate how these
laws apply in practice to motion pictures.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION - BACKGROUND
A. Purpose of United States Copyright Protection
By granting copyrights, Congress effectively gives the author a
monopoly on the use of the work. This monopoly is "intended to moti-
vate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their
genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired."2 Copy-
1. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
2. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
Universal Studios claimed Sony violated Universal's motion picture copyrights by pro-
ducing videotape recorders which allowed purchasers to videotape motion pictures
which had been shown on television. Universal did not claim Sony made the infringing
copies, but that the copies made by consumers violated its copyright. Consequently,
Sony was accused of providing the means of violating the copyright, rather than a
(293)
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right law represents a difficult balance between the authors' interest in
control of their work and society's interest in the free flow of ideas and
information.$ When Congress restructured the copyright laws in 1909,
it acknowledged that copyright legislation is aimed at serving public
welfare, not the author's natural right in his or her work.4 Congress
balanced the public benefits and harm attributable to granting copy-
rights when it passed the copyright law in 1909 and the subsequent
changes to the law. The public benefits are derived from the fact that
the monopoly motivates producers to produce works. On the other
hand, the public harm is caused by restricting public use of the work
by granting the producer a monopoly. Congress authorizes copyrights
only to the extent the public benefit outweighs the harm from the tem-
porary monopoly.'
B. Early Copyright Laws Around the World
Although printing from movable type was first used in England in
the late 15th century, this new trade did not create an immediate
threat of unauthorized reproductions since there were few printing
presses." The first concern was preventing the importation and sale of
English language books printed abroad.' In 1557, the "Stationer's
Company" was chartered by Catholic Queen Mary and King Philip in
England to control the spread of the Protestant Reformation by con-
centrating the printing business in the hands of the Stationer's Com-
pany.8 The Stationer's Company was actually interested in taking ad-
vantage of their printing monopoly by eliminating competition rather
than religious or political censorship as the King and Queen intended.
Since works had to be registered in the name of a member of the Sta-
tioner's Company regardless of whether that person was the actual
direct violation. The Court considered the legitimate uses of copying equipment and
testimony from other producers who stated they didn't object to an individual taping a
program to watch at a later time (time-shifting their viewing). The Court did not find
Sony liable for copyright violation because they were merely the seller of the equip-
ment which expanded the viewing audience by time-shifting; they did not have any
direct involvement with any infringing activity; and the videotape recorders have signif-
icant non-infringing uses. Id. at 442-8.
3. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429.
4. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429 n.10 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909)).
5. Id.
6. WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 2-3 (6th ed. 1986).




originator of the work, the member was able to claim the right to print
the work for himself and his heirs forever.1" During the early seven-
teenth century, Parliament passed several licensing acts supporting the
Company by forbidding unauthorized printing of books originally pub-
lished by Stationer's Company members." However, in 1694, Parlia-
ment refused to extend the licensing acts, and independent printers be-
gan to spring up and invade the domain of the Stationer's Company as
their monopoly ended.' 2
Parliament compromised with the Stationer's Company's demands
for unlimited protection against these pirates by passing the Statute of
Anne which limited the exclusive right of publication to a set number
of years. 13 This statute provided a monopoly of limited duration, rather
than the unlimited monopoly the Stationer's Company previously en-
joyed. However, this limited monopoly was not reserved for Stationer's
Company members. For the first time, this statute specifically recog-
nized the rights of authors, rather than Stationer's Company members,
and it provided the foundation for later copyright law in the United
States.' 4 It gave authors or their assigns the sole right of publication
for twenty-one years and imposed penalties for violating the Act as
long as the author had entered the title of the work in the registry of
books of the Stationer's Hall as evidence of ownership of the work and
a copy of the work was deposited in certain designated libraries in
Great Britain. 5 Later, Parliament required that a notice of the entry in
the register of books appear in every copy of the published work so
others would have notice of the author's copyright.'" To avoid unrea-
sonable prices being charged for copyrighted works, Parliament al-
lowed anyone who objected to the price of a work to petition designated
officials who could lower the price.'
II. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAWS
A. Early United States Copyright Laws




13. PATRY, supra note 6, at 3-4.
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states except Delaware passed laws giving some protection to authors,
but the protection was limited to the boundaries of each state.18 Conse-
quently, authors had to comply with laws of a variety of jurisdictions to
obtain widespread protection.' 9 The framers of the Constitution recog-
nized the benefit of federal copyright protection to alleviate this burden
of complying with multiple laws to protect a single work.2"
The origin of copyright and patent protection in the United States
is found in Article I, Section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution which
gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '"21 Con-
gress passed the first copyright law in 1790,2 protecting both published
and unpublished books, maps, and charts for 14 years after the title
was recorded with the district court clerk, followed by notice of title in
one or more newspapers for four weeks, and depositing a copy of the
work with the Secretary of State.23 Since copyright protection was gov-
erned by a federal law, Congress eventually gave federal courts original
jurisdiction over copyright cases. 4 The first copyright case heard by
the Supreme Court was Wheaton v. Peters,2 5 challenging the replace-
ment of state common law rights of authors with federal protection
under the Act of 1790 (the federal Copyright Act).26
Protection within the United States of works with foreign copy-
rights and works with a United States copyright which were published
or distributed abroad was more difficult to achieve than protection
within the United States of works published in the United States. The
Act of 1790 protected works of U.S. citizens and residents, but pro-
vided no protection to works published by those who were not U.S.
citizens or residents.2 Since foreign nationals were denied copyright
protection by the United States, foreign nations refused to protect
works with United States copyrights.2 8 In response to other nations'
18. PATRY, supra note 6, at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT at
OV-1 (Supp. 1994).
23. PATRY, supra note 6, at 6.
24. PATRY, supra note 6, at 7.
25. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
26. PATRY, supra note 6, at 7.
27. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 16.1, at
678-79 (1989).
28. Id. at 679.
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denying copyright protection to works published in the United States,
the Chace Act was enacted in 1891 to relax the isolationist position of
the United States.29 The Chace Act allowed the President to negotiate
bilateral agreements to extend U.S. copyright protection to works of
foreign nationals as long as that foreign country gave works of United
States nationals essentially the same protection it gave works of its own
nationals.30 Foreign authors were able to receive copyright protection
as long as they complied with the title, notice, and deposit requirements
of the United States copyright law.3' Over the next fifty years, the
United States entered into bilateral agreements with thirty-eight coun-
tries to provide copyright protection. 2 As the international trade of the
United States increased, these agreements did not provide sufficient
protection, but hopes of obtaining broader protection by the participa-
tion of the United States in the Berne Convention (discussed infra
under "International Protection for Foreign Copyright Violations of
works created in the United States") dimmed in 1928 when the Con-
vention was revised to add moral rights to its protection which enabled
an author to object to modifications of his or her work which
"prejudiced the author's honor or reputation."3 3
B. The Copyright Act of 1909
Rather than amending the United States copyright laws to allow
membership in the Berne International Copyright Union, U.S. laws
were modified in a piecemeal manner resulting in a variety of miscella-
neous laws which were hard to interpret and which sometimes provided
unexpected results.3 4 In the early 20th century, the Register of Copy-
rights, Thorvald Solberg, recommended a single consolidated act which
led to the Copyright Act of 1909.15 Some of the notable improvements
over prior law included broadening copyrightable subject matter to in-
29. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 16.1 at 679; Chace Act, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891).
30. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 16.1 at 679; Chace Act, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891).
31. PATRY, supra note 6, at 8. The notice and deposit requirement were contrary
to the Berne Convention which established the International Copyright Union in 1886.
The Berne Convention provided automatic protection throughout all countries acceding
to the convention. Works were covered whether or not the authors were citizens of
countries in the Union as long as they published their work in a Union country no later
than publication elsewhere. Id. at 9.
32. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 16.1, at 679.
33. 1 NEIL BOORSTYN, BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT § 17.01(1) at 17-3 (Dvora
Parker ed., 2d ed. 1994).
34. PATRY, supra note 6, at 9.
35. Id.
1995]
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elude all writings of the author, and no longer requiring foreign books
in foreign language to be reprinted in the United States in order to be
protected. 6 The Act took a step backwards, though, by excluding un-
published works from federal protection."7 In 1912, the 1909 Act was
amended to make motion pictures expressly eligible for copyright pro-
tection.3 8 The Copyright Act of 1909, with amendments, remained in
effect through 1977 and it continues to apply to pre-1978 causes of
action.39
Prior to 1978, various states provided common law copyright pro-
tection in addition to federal copyright protection. 0 A work would au-
tomatically receive state common law copyright protection from crea-
tion and this protection continued in perpetuity or until the work was
published.41 Following publication and satisfaction of federal copyright
formalities, the work would have federal copyright protection for a cer-
tain number of years.42 Consequently, copyright law evolved from fed-
eral constitutional and statutory law as well as from state common law.
C. Current Copyright Law and its Protection
The Copyright Act of 1976, effective January 1, 1978, was a com-
prehensive revision to the 1909 Act. 43 This law ended dual state and
federal copyright protection because Congress preempted the field."
The current statute specifically defines works eligible for copyright
protection to be "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression .... Works of authorship include ... motion pic-
tures. '"' 5 To be able to claim copyright ownership, the party must es-
tablish (1) originality in the author, (2) that the work is eligible for
copyright protection, (3) that the author's citizenship permits a copy-
right claim, (4) compliance with applicable statutory formalities, and
(5) if the party enforcing the copyright is not the author, valid transfer
of rights or a relationship with the author which allows the party to be
36. PATRY, supra note 6, at 10.
37. Id.
38. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at OV-1 n.6.
39. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at OV-1.
40. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at OV-3.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at OV-2 citing Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. 94-
553, 90 Stat. 2541.
44. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at OV-3.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1988).
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the valid copyright claimant. 6
The statute gives copyright owners the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or ...rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other au-
diovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural works, including the individual images of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work
publicly.' 7
The only two elements which a plaintiff must prove to establish a
copyright infringement action are ownership by the plaintiff and copy-
ing of constituent elements of the work that are original. 8
D. Remedies for Violation of U.S. Copyrights
Remedies under the Copyright Act of 1976 include both actual
and statutory damages as well as equitable relief such as injunctions
and impoundment of the infringing articles.' 9 17 U.S.C. § 502 autho-
rizes any court with jurisdiction over the cause of action to "grant tem-
porary and final injunctions ... to prevent or restrain infringement of a
copyright,"' 50 but the injunction is only operative throughout the United
States. 1 The court may impound all copies, plates, film negatives, etc.
claimed to have been made in violation of the copyright while the ac-
tion is pending5" and its final judgment may order the destruction of
46. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 13.01(A) at 13-6 to -7, (1994).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
48. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.01, at 13-6.
49. JOHN W. HAZARD, JR., COPYRIGHT LAW IN BUSINESS AND PRACTICE § 9.1, at
9-1 (1989).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a)(1988).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1988).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1988).
1995]
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these items.83 Either statutory damages are assessed or damages are
equal to the copyright owner's actual damages plus any additional prof-
its the infringer earned.5 ' Statutory damages range from $500 to
$20,000 per work.55 An innocent infringer who was misled because an
authorized copy of the work failed to contain a copyright notice may be
allowed to continue to use the work upon payment of a reasonable li-
cense fee."
A party can face criminal penalties if he is found to have violated
willfully a copyright for the purpose of commercial advantage or pri-
vate financial gain.
III. LEGAL PARALLELS BETWEEN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW
The fields of patent and copyright law are related since they both
stem from the same sentence in the U.S. Constitution.5" These constitu-
tionally-derived exclusive rights encourage the advancement of useful
arts, through patents, 59 and creative arts, through copyrights. In spite
of their common constitutional basis, patent and copyright laws provide
different protections and have significantly different requirements for
their protection.
The three fundamental conditions for patentability are utility, nov-
elty and nonobviousness. 6° The grant of a patent encourages invest-
ment-based risk and innovation"' and patent law protects processes and
methods of operation.6 2 Patent law grants patents for a new use of a
known process or product,63 encouraging design around a competitor's
products. 6 ' An inventor must apply for a patent and it will only be
53. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1988).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1988).
55. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(West Supp. 1994).
56. PATRY, supra note 6, at 276.
57. 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)(West Supp. 1994).
58. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
59. ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, § 1.1(b), at 8 (3d
ed. 1994). Patents are available for "any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof." Id. at 33
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101). Frivolous or inoperable inventions do not qualify for patent
protection. Id. at 34. In 1966, the Supreme Court held that "a continuing requirement
for patentability is the demonstration of a specific and substantial utility." Id. at 44
(citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966)).
60. HARMON, supra note 59, § 2.1, at 34.
61. HARMON, supra note 59, § 1.1(b), at 8.
62. HARMON, supra note 59, § 1.4(a), at 15 (citation omitted).
63. HARMON, supra note 59, § 2.2(a)(i), at 34.
64. HARMON, supra note 59, § 1.2, at 8.
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granted once the United States Patent and Trademark Office deter-
mines no one else has patented an identical invention, 5 although the
patent technically is available to the first inventor rather than the first
filer.66 The patent law gives the patent owner the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling a patented invention, 1 but it does
not give him the unrestricted right to copy or use the patented subject
matter.68
Copyright law balances the authors' desire to control their works
against the public's interest in the free flow of information and ideas."9
The Copyright Act of 1976 allows others to "exploit facts, ideas,
processes, or methods of operation in copyrighted works," which lets
others build on the ideas and information in the copyrighted work.70
In contrast to patents, a work only needs to be an original, inde-
pendent work which has not been copied from another work to be enti-
tled to copyright protection. 71 Although a patent protects against some-
one else who later makes the same invention, a copyright does not
protect against an identical work which is independently created. Both
parties can copyright the identical work and enforce the copyright
against everyone except the other independent creator of the work. 72
Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, a copyright was separate from the
common law right of literary property or right of first publication. 7
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, a work whose subject matter is cov-
ered by the Copyright Act is automatically protected by copyright law
from its creation.7 4
The Federal Circuit Court distinguished between patent and copy-
right protection of computer programs encoded in semiconductor chips
in Atari v. Nintendo.7 5 The Copyright Act protects "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."78 Works of au-
thorship include computer programs and instructions encoded in silicon
65. PATRY, supra note 6, at 1.
66. HARMON, supra note 59, § 1.3, at 12.
67. HARMON, supra note 59, § 1.1(a), at 5 (citations omitted).
68. HARMON, supra note 59, § 1.1(b), at 6 (citations omitted).
69. HARMON, supra note 59, § 1.4(a), at 15.
70. Id.




75. HARMON, supra note 59, § 1.4(a), at 15 (citing Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
76. HARMON, supra note 59, § 1.4(a) at 15.
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chips.7 The copyrighted protection applies to the expression of the
programmer's ideas, not to the processes or methodology adopted by
the programmer.78 Patent law protects the process or method per-
formed by the computer program.7 9
Since the patent field is more developed, courts tend to apply par-
allel analysis for copyright disputes.8" However, "[tlhe two areas of the
law ...are not identical twins and [courts] exercise . ..caution in
applying doctrine formulated in one area to the other."81
IV. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
A. Patent Law
The concept of third party liability in both patent and copyright
law "is grounded [iln the recognition that adequate protection of a mo-
nopoly may require the courts to look beyond actual duplication of a
device or publication to the products or activities that make such dupli-
cation possible." 82
Since, as mentioned above, patent law may be used to interpret
copyright law when copyright law is unclear, the patent law definition
of contributory (or third party) infringement is important in the field of
copyright law. The Patent Act specifies that anyone who "actively in-
duces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer" 88 and
also establishes a separate category of contributory infringer.84 A con-
tributory infringer is defined in Section 271(c) of the Patent Act as
someone who sells a component of a patented machine knowing it will
be used to infringe on the patent.85 As a result, the Patent Act divides
the concept of infringement into active (or direct) inducement, and
contributory infringement.88 Section 271(c) even prohibits the practice
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. HARMON, supra note 59, § 1.4(a) at 16.
80. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984)(citing
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp.
v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657-658
(1834)).
81. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19 (citing generally Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
217-218 (1954); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 345 (1908)).
82. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1988).
84. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1988).
85. Id.
86. HARMON, supra note 59, § 6.4 at 239.
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW
of selling a component which might not technically be covered by a
patent, but which has no other use except in the patented product or
process.81 Liability as a contributory infringer under Section 271(c)
merely requires knowledge that an activity infringes on a patent; it
does not require intent.8
In patent law, a direct infringement must be established before
contributory infringement or inducement of infringement can also be
found.8" In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., it was argued
that there was contributory infringement of Laitram's patented ma-
chine when Deepsouth shipped the unpatented component parts abroad
to be assembled beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. patent law.90 Laitram
lost the argument, for the Supreme Court required that a direct in-
fringement be established before the Court would find a third party
liable for contributory infringement. 91 Since the direct infringement in
Deepsouth occurred abroad and the Patent Act did not reach beyond
the U.S. borders, the Court found no contributory infringement.92 In
1984, Congress amended the Patent Act to categorize the action in
Deepsouth as inducement, and to make contributory infringement ac-
tionable even if the direct infringement occurs abroad.93 The Patent
Act still leaves a loophole for those who sell unpatented apparatus in
the United States to be used abroad to practice a patented procedure.94
B. Copyright Law
Although the 1909 Copyright Act did not specifically state the de-
gree of participation needed for third party liability for copyright in-
fringement, the courts have long recognized third party liability.95 The
principle of third party liability for copyright infringement was first
recognized in 1916 when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the
maker, printer, and seller of an infringing photograph jointly liable for
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. HARMON, supra note 59, § 6.4, at 239 (citations omitted).
90. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
91. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 526 (quoting Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co.,
320 U.S. 661, 677 (1944)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting on other grounds)). Deepsouth is
discussed in more detail in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Laws section
of this note.
92. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531.
93. HARMON, supra note 59, § 6.4 at 240; 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1988).
94. HARMON, supra note 59, § 6.4, at 240.
95. See Gershwin Publ. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 442 F.2d 1159, 1161-
62 (2d Cir. 1971).
1995]
304 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 19
copyright infringement.9 6 Contributory infringement under the 1909
Copyright Act depended on whether the authorized or encouraged ac-
tivity by itself would constitute a copyright infringement. 9 Courts
looked to the function the contributory infringer plays in the infringing
activity when they decided whether to hold a third party liable for
copyright infringement.98
Like the 1909 Copyright Act but unlike the Patent Act, the Copy-
right Act of 1976 does not expressly address liability for a party who
merely authorizes an infringement which is actually committed by an-
other party.9 9 Since a violation of a copyright occurs only when one of
the rights listed in 17 U.S.C. § 106 is infringed upon, an infringing
act generally must be carried out to establish contributory liability of
the party authorizing the infringement; it is unusual for the act of au-
thorization alone to infringe on a copyright without associated direct
infringement. 10 The words "to authorize" which were added by the
Copyright Act of 1976 were intended to avoid questions about the lia-
bility of contributory infringers."' A contributory infringer "induces,
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of an-
other."1 02 For example, someone who furnishes the copyrighted work
that another party wrongfully copies may be liable as a contributory
infringer. 03 A party is probably not protected from liability as a con-
tributory infringer merely because the infringing activity is not actually
carried out under that party's direct supervision. 0 4
V. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. STATUTES
A. Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application
"'[W]hen it desires to do so, Congress knows how to place the
96. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 n.7 (citing Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230
F.2d 4121 (2d Cir. 1916)).
97. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
98. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Tele-
vision, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1968)).
99. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984).
100. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04(A)(3)(a) at 12-89.
101. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976), reprinted in Historical
and Revision Notes following 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
102. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04(A)(2)(a) at 12-76 (citing Gershwin Publ.
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
103. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04(A)(2)(b) at 12-78.
104. 3 NiMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04(A)(2)(b) at 12-78, 79.
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high seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute.' ,,'05 Although
Congress has the authority to enact laws which apply to actions outside
the territorial boundaries of the United States, the question of whether
a particular law has extraterritorial applications is a matter of statu-
tory construction. 10 6 "It is a longstanding principle of American law
'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.' "107 The Supreme Court has indicated that since "Congress
legislates against a backdrop of the presumption against extraterritori-
ality,"' 1 8 the Court presumes a law applies only to actions within the
United States unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise. 10 9
The presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws
avoids "unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations
which could result in international discord."110 If Congress intends a
law to have extraterritorial application, it is reasonable to expect Con-
gress to address possible conflicts with foreign laws.' For example,
when Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA) to apply overseas, it specifically addressed potential
conflicts with foreign law.'
The Supreme Court has also found extraterritorial application of
the Lanham Act, designed to prevent the deceptive and misleading use
of trademarks." 2 This construction of the Lanham Act can be used to
determine the extraterritoriality of other laws. The Court relied on the
Act's broad jurisdictional grant (its application to "all commerce which
may lawfully be regulated by Congress""') and the constitutional
power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations to find
the law applicable to a trademark violation occurring outside the
105. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991)(quoting
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989)).
106. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
107. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc., v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949)). The EEOC sought to apply Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to employment practices of U.S. firms that employ U.S. citizens abroad. Id. at 244.
108. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
109. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949) and Benz v. Campania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).
110. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
111. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 256.
112. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 256 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)).
113. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252 (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 334 U.S. 280,
286 (1952)).
114. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
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United States.11 5
B. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Law
In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.116 (referenced earlier
under the discussion of contributory infringement under United States
patent law), both Deepsouth and Laitram made machines to devein
shrimp."' Through litigation, Laitram established that it held the
United States patent for the deveining machine. " 8 Laitram's patent
was not granted on the component parts of the machine, but instead,
the patent applied to the novel combination of the machine's parts. " 9
Deepsouth would clearly violate Laitram's patent by assembling the
machines in the United States since assembly would constitute the
novel combination of the parts. Consequently, Deepsouth wanted to be
able to export its machines less than fully assembled so they could be
assembled and used abroad, even though it was enjoined from selling
the assembled machines in the United States because of Laitram's pat-
ent.120 Therefore, the dispute in Deepsouth centered around whether
Deepsouth violated Laitram's patent by exporting the component parts
so they could be assembled abroad in the novel way which was the
basis for Laitram's patent. The Court interpreted patent law as grant-
ing a monopoly only over the United States market 2' and stated
"[o]ur patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect."1 2' Pat-
ent law "reveals a congressional intent" to have a U.S. patent holder
seek protection for foreign patent infringements "through patents se-
cured in countries where his goods are being used."1 23 The Supreme
Court interpreted patent laws to require "direct infringement ... in the
United States" before finding liability for facilitating exploitation of a
patent abroad.124
In 1984, Congress amended the Patent Act. The amendments re-
versed the Supreme Court's refusal in Deepsouth to find contributory
115. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252 (citing Steele, 334 U.S. at 285, 287, and U.S.
Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
116. Deepsouth Packing Co., v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
117. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 519.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 521.
120. Id. at 519.
121. Id. at 523.
122. Id. at 531.
123. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271).
124. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04(A)(3)(b) n.98 at 12-89 (citing Deepsouth,
406 U.S. at 527).
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patent infringement when the alleged direct infringement occurred
outside the United States.12 Patent law now extends the definition of
patent infringement to include supplying any component of a patented
invention with the knowledge that it will be used outside the United
States in a manner that would constitute patent infringement in the
United States. 12
C. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Copyright Law
Congress has not made a similar amendment to the copyright act
to extend the protection to foreign infringement. As described earlier in
this note, the copyright law grants the copyright holder exclusive rights
as described earlier in this note but makes no separate mention of ac-
tions occurring outside the United States. The courts look for a clear
indication from Congress before applying a statute to actions occurring
in a foreign country, and there is no such indication in the copyright
law that Congress intended the law to have extraterritorial application.
As a result, copyright protection under U.S. law is territorial and the
rights of the copyright holder only apply to infringing acts within the
United States. 12 7
A violation occurring entirely outside the United States is actiona-
ble under the laws of the country in which the violation occurred.128
However, if part of an infringing act takes place in the United States,
U.S. copyright law applies to the part of the violation attributable to
actions occurring within the United States. 2 9 Since contributory liabil-
ity for copyright infringement requires direct infringement as well, the
question at the heart of Subafilms was whether the direct infringement
as well as the contributory acts must take place in the United States
before a contributory infringer will be held liable for copyright in-
fringement under U.S. law.'3 0
VI. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR WORKS CREATED
IN THE UNITED STATES
Since there is no international copyright, copyrights exist only
under the laws of individual countries, "' although a country can pro-
125. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271 (1988).
126. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(0(2) (West Supp. 1994).
127. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 16.0 at 675.
128. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 16.0 at 675-76.
129. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 17.02 at 17-19.
130. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
131. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 16.3 at 682.
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vide protection under its copyright law for infringing actions which oc-
cur in another country. The Chace Act authorized the United States to
negotiate bilateral agreements to protect copyrights. 182 These bilateral
agreements can be divided into two types: (1) formal copyright treaties
setting forth substantive rights in specific terms, and (2) presidential
proclamations extending U.S. copyright protection to citizens of other
countries once those countries provided adequate protection under their
laws to copyrights of U.S. citizens."3 ' The intent of these agreements
was to provide the same copyright protection to citizens of a specified
country as that country provides to U.S. citizens.'34 Since countries
tend to implement agreements differently, U.S. citizens didn't always
get the anticipated protection.133 The United States continued to nego-
tiate bilateral agreements until the 1950s when it finally joined the
Universal Copyright Convention, a multinational copyright organiza-
tion."3 6 The United States entered into a total of thirty-eight bilateral
treaties. 3
A copyright cause of action can be transitory, such that the action
can be brought in any court with jurisdiction over the defendant, al-
though the laws of the country where the infringement took place will
be applied. 3 " A transitory cause of action is not directly addressed in
either the Berne Convention or the Universal Copyright Convention
(discussed below), I3 9 so they do not provide a framework for establish-
ing jurisdiction in such a case. Not all countries will exercise jurisdic-
tion over transitory causes of action taking place in another country
even though they have jurisdiction over the defendant. Several Euro-
pean countries have allowed suits based on a cause of action which
occurred in one country when the suit was brought in another coun-
try.1"" If the remedy under laws of the country in which the infringe-
ment took place is essentially a penal remedy, the United States' courts
132. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 17.01(C)(1)(a) at 17-13 to 17-14.
133. Id.; Chace Act, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891).
134. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 17.01(C)(1)(a) at 17-14.
135. Id.
136. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 17.01(C)(l)(a) at 17-15; Universal Copyright
Convention, 6 U.S.T. 2731 (1952), revised 25 U.S.T. 1341 (1971).
137. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 16.1 at 679; all copyright treaties to which
the United States is a party can be found in United States Treaties and Other Interna-
tional Agreements (1950 - present), or the Treaties and Other International Acts Se-
ries (1945 - present), or the Treaty Series (1778 - 1945).




will generally decline jurisdiction. 4 A suit to remedy a violation of a
foreign law which is brought in a U.S. court could also be dismissed for
the general ground of forum non conveniens. 42
The United States adheres to two multilateral copyright treaties -
the Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works - which provide the most
common basis for protecting the works of U.S. nationals from copy-
right infringements which occur abroad. 4 Under these treaties, U.S.
nationals enjoy the same protection as nationals of the country in which
the alleged copyright violation occurred. 44 In order to receive protec-
tion under these conventions, a U.S. copyright owner must first estab-
lish that the work is entitled to copyright protection in the country
where the violation occurred and that it owns the copyright in that
country.14 5
The Universal Copyright Convention (U.C.C.) became effective in
the United States in 1955; it protects works created or first published
in the United States. 46 This treaty was designed to accommodate the
United States which had earlier refused to give up its requirement of
copyright formalities. This sticking point had prevented the U.S. from
joining the Berne Union. 47 The U.C.C. allows formalities, but it con-
siders formalities such as deposit, registration, notice, etc. satisfied as
long as the work bears the symbol © accompanied by the name of the
copyright proprietor and the year of first publication to give reasonable
notice of the copyright claim. 48
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works was established in 1886 when ten countries (the Berne Union)
agreed to recognize copyright protection across their national bounda-
141. Id. at 684.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 676-7.
144. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 17.01(B)(1) at 17-8.
145. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, § 16.0 at 676. Foreign copyright protection
typically requires compliance with one of the following four conditions:
(1) the author if the work is a national or domiciliary of the foreign country; (2) the
author of the work is a national or domiciliary of a country which the foreign country
has established copyright relations through a multilateral or bilateral treaty or through
proclamation; (3) the work was first published in the foreign country; or (4) the work
was first published in a country with which the foreign country has established copy-
right relations.
Id.
146. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 16.1 at 680.
147. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 17.01(B)(2) at 17-10 to 17-11.
148. Universal Copyright Convention, Jul. 24, 1971, art. 3, reprinted in Historical
and Revision Notes following 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1988).
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ries. 149 At that time, the United States did not provide protection for
any works with a foreign copyright, so the United States did not par-
ticipate in the formation of the Berne Convention.' 5" The five main
objectives of the Berne Convention were (1) having all civilized coun-
tries establish copyright laws, (2) eliminating reciprocity as a basis for
extending copyright protection to foreign nationals, (3) giving foreign
and domestic authors the same protection, (4) eliminating formalities
as a condition of protection, and (5) promoting uniform international
law to protect copyrightable works.' 5'
Shortly after the Berne Convention was signed, the United States
copyright laws were modified to allow protection for foreign works. The
United States was loathe to join the Berne Convention, though, since
the Convention prohibits formalities as a requirement of copyright pro-
tection. 152 Proponents urging the United States to adhere to the Berne
Convention pointed to two primary benefits of membership: (1) the
United States would have immediate copyright relations for the first
time with twenty-four nations with whom it did not have bilateral
agreements, and (2) membership would be a moral statement of the
importance of international protection of intellectual property through
adherence to the treaty with the highest standards of protection. 53
Without the Berne Convention's protection, U.S. copyright holders
suffered mounting losses because countries that had not ratified the
U.C.C. and did not have bilateral copyright relationships with the
United States had no obligation to protect U.S. copyrights.15 4 World-
wide demand for works protected by United States copyrights grew
rapidly, accompanied by mushrooming pirating of United States copy-
righted works. 55 In addition, technological developments generated
new forms of creative and protectible works, and membership in the
Berne Union was believed to provide better protection for United
States authors than relying only on U.S. laws. 156 The United States'
reluctance to join the Berne Union hindered the worldwide General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade talks since the United States was
viewed as not being fully committed to international protection of copy-
149. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 17.01(B)(1) at 17-6.
150. BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 33, § 17.01(1) at 17-2.
151. ID. at 17-1 to 17-2.
152. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Jul. 24,
1971, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715, art. 5.
153. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 17.01(C)(2)(a) at 17-17 to 17-18.
154. Id. at 17-16.
155. BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 33, § 17.01(1) at 17-3.
156. BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 33, § 17.01(1) at 17-3.
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rightable works. 157 Finally, in 1988, the U.S. modified its 1976 Copy-
right Act by passing the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, wherein the United States gave up its resistance to the Berne
Convention's position on formalities. 1 ' As a result, the Berne Conven-
tion became effective in the United States for works published after
that date March 1, 1989.159
The Berne Convention's enforcement mechanism, through which
one country complains that another country is not providing anticipated
copyright protection to foreign nationals, is deficient. A country can
only bring an action against another country in the International Court
of Justice, a cumbersome procedure which has never been invoked. 160
Consequently, the Berne Convention is not an ideal way to protect au-
thor's rights.' 6 '
VII. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE COPYRIGHT
PROVISIONS
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' (GATT) will
hopefully provide a remedy to Berne's enforcement mechanism defi-
ciency. 63 The United States will be able to file copyright complaints
against other GATT nations under the GATT framework.6 All Uru-
guay Round Agreements (the current version of GATT being consid-
ered for ratification around the world) have a single dispute settlement
system.6 5 The Dispute Settlement Understanding establishes a GATT
panel to issue reports based on complaints by member nations, contem-
plates appellate review of panel rulings, sets time limits for countries to
157. BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 33, § 17.01(1) at 17-3.
158. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 16.7 at 697.
159. RAPHAEL V. LuPO AND DONNA M. TANGUAY, WHAT CORPORATE AND GEN-
ERAL PRACTITIONERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION
§ 4.01, at 54 (1991).
160. DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT, COPY-
RIGHT'S TRADE STATUS: GATT AND NAFTA AND OTHER RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVEL-
OPMENTS 7 (1994).
161. NIMMER, supra note 160 at 7.
162. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) evolved from efforts
in the 1940s to establish a world body governing trade that would compliment the
international system created by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
GATT's purpose was to foster trade by overcoming the inhibiting effect of national
laws on free trade. GATT was "the economic pillar within the legal framework that
was designed to build a peaceful world after 1945." Nimmer, supra note 160, at 9.
163. NIMMER, supra note 160, at 8.
164. Id.
165. ID. at 30.
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bring their laws into compliance with GATT, and authorizes retaliation
if a country does not comply within the time limit.166
GATT places several requirements on member nations with re-
spect to copyrights. (1) They must comply with the Berne Conven-
tion. 167 (2) They must protect computer programs as literary works
under the Berne Convention. 68 (3) They must prohibit commercial
rental to the public of unauthorized copies of computer programs and
cinematographic works. 6 9 [Movie rentals are a possible problem area
for the United States, since video rental shops are widespread. GATT
does provide an exception from this requirement unless rentals have led
to widespread copying of the copyrighted works.1 70 ] (4) They must es-
tablish a minimum copyright duration for works other than a photo-
graphic work or work of applied art. 71 (5) They must limit exceptions
to exclusive rights to certain special cases.172 (6) Neighboring rights
are applied to performers, producers of phonograms, and broadcasting
organizations. 73 GATT has no domestic legal effect until a country
implements the agreements through legislation.
1 74
VIII. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
OF COPYRIGHT LAWS
A. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Decision in Peter Starr
The United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia had dismissed a copyright infringement claim brought by Peter
Starr Production Co. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), concluding the defendant had not violated U.S.
copyright law because the violation occurred outside the United
States. 7 ' Peter Starr held the copyright to several motion pictures, in-
cluding "Take It to the Limit.' 76 Starr authorized an agent to look for
European distributors for several films, including "Take It to the
166. Id.
167. ID. at 20.
168. Id. at 21.
169. Id. at 22.
170. ID.
171. Id. at 23.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 24.
174. ID. at 14.




Limit," but the agent was not authorized to bind Starr to any distribu-
tion agreements. 1" Alpha Films Ltd. wanted the distribution rights to
"Take It to the Limit," but Starr rejected its offer.1" 8 In spite of that
rejection, Starr's agent entered into a licensing agreement with Alpha
giving Alpha exclusive foreign distribution rights for "Take It to the
Limit."1 9 The license agreement was negotiated in France, but was
signed in Los Angeles.18
The Peter Starr court observed that copyright laws do not have
extraterritorial effect, so actions which take place entirely outside the
United States are not actionable in U.S. courts.181 Starr argued that
the agent's infringing act was to authorize Alpha to distribute the film,
by executing a contract with Alpha, without Starr's consent. 82 The
court referred to the Supreme Court's statement in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.1 83 that "an infringer is not
merely one who uses a work without authorization of the copyright
owner, but also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work with-
out actual authority from the copyright owner."1 8" The court in Peter
Starr concluded that mere execution of the contract with Alpha was
sufficient to constitute copyright infringement (as long as that authori-
zation took place in the United States) even though the actual distribu-
tion did not violate any U.S. laws (since the distribution was
extraterritorial) 185
B. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Decision in Lewis Galoob
Toys
However, the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to find mere authoriza-
tion to be contributory infringement in another case, Lewis Galoob
Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. 8' Nintendo appealed a United





181. Peter Starr, 783 F.2d at 1442 (citing Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v.
O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976)).
182. Peter Starr, 783 F.2d at 1442.
183. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
184. Peter Starr, 783 F.2d at 1443 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984)).
185. Peter Starr, 783 F.2d at 1443.
186. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir.
1992), aJffg Nintendo of Am., Inc., v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 780 F.Supp. 1283
(N.D.Cal. 1991).
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Lewis Galoob Toy's "Game Genie" did not infringe on Nintendo's
copyrighted "Entertainment System. 1 87 The Game Genie allowed
players to alter up to three features of a Nintendo game."'8 Nintendo
did not allege that the Game Genie directly infringed on its copyright;
instead it claimed the Game Genie "contribute[d] to the creation of
infringing derivatives of Nintendo's copyrighted ...games" by ena-
bling the consumer to modify the copyrighted game. 189 Nintendo
claimed the derivative work which allegedly violated its copyright was
created when a consumer used a Game Genie to alter a copyrighted
Nintendo game. 190
A derivative work under the copyright law is based on a preexist-
ing work and it must be permanent.""' The statutory examples of deriv-
ative works all physically incorporate the underlying work into the re-
sulting derivative work. 92 However, in this case, no permanent work
was created when the Game Genie was used to alter a Nintendo game,
so there was no copyright violation since no derivative work, as defined
in the copyright law, was created.' The court stated that "a party
cannot authorize another party to infringe a copyright unless the au-
thorized conduct would itself be unlawful."' 94 Since the Game Genie
did not assist in the creation of an illegal derivative work, Lewis
Galoob Toys had not infringed on Nintendo's copyright for its games.
Both the Lewis Galoob Toys and the Peter Starr decisions will be dis-
cussed in more detail below when they are contrasted with the
Subafilms decision.
IX. NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN SUBAFILMS
A. The Dispute
In 1966, Hearst Corporation and the musical group The Beatles
entered into a joint venture through Subafilms, Ltd. to make the
animated motion picture entitled "Yellow Submarine."' 9 5 Hearst, on
187. Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 967, appealing the holding in Nintendo of
Am., Inc., 780 F.Supp. at 1298.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 970.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 967.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 968.
194. Id. at 970.
195. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1089.
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behalf of the joint venture, entered into an agreement with United Art-
ists Corporation for United Artists to distribute the motion picture. 196
Beginning in 1968, after the motion picture was completed, United
Artists distributed the "Yellow Submarine" to theaters and television
broadcasters within the United States. 97
In the early 1980s, as home video use was becoming popular,
United Artists began distributing some of its motion pictures on video-
cassette. 98 Since it was unsure whether the licensing agreement with
Hearst and Subafilms granted it home video distribution rights, it de-
clined to license "Yellow Submarine" for videocassette distribution.1 99
By 1987, United Artists had merged with MGM and became MGM/
UA (and is now known as MGM/Pathe).00 In 1987, although the
Subafilms/Hearst joint venture objected, MGM/UA authorized do-
mestic home video distribution of "Yellow Submarine" through its sub-
sidiary MGM/UA Home Video Inc.201 MGM/UA had an arrange-
ment with Warner Brothers licensing Warner to distribute MGM/UA
films overseas."'2 In 1987, MGM/UA notified Warner Brothers that
"Yellow Submarine" had been cleared for international videocassette
distribution.2 08 In 1988, Subafilms and Hearst sued MGM/UA and
Warner claiming the domestic and international videocassette distribu-
tion of "Yellow Submarine" constituted a copyright violation and
breached the 1967 distribution agreements. 04
B. The District Court Decision
The case was tried before a special master and then reviewed by
the United States District Court for the Central District of California,
which adopted the special master's findings of fact and conclusions of
law.20 5 The special master and District Court found for Subafilms and
awarded $2,228,000 in compensatory damages split evenly between for-
eign and domestic home video distribution.206 The domestic portion of










205. Id. at 1088-89.
206. Id. at 1089.
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Appeals.
C. The Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
United States District Court's ruling in an unpublished opinion.20 7 The
panel's ruling with respect to the foreign distribution relied on the Pe-
ter Starr0 8 decision, which held that mere authorization within the
United States of a copyright violation which was carried out abroad
was sufficient to constitute copyright infringement under United States
copyright law.20 9 Since the illegal distribution of "Yellow Submarine"
was authorized in the United States, the Ninth Circuit panel upheld
the District Court's ruling that MGM/UA violated the U.S. Copyright
Act with respect to the foreign distribution of "Yellow Submarine.
2 10
The panel did not consider the alternative breach of contract claim.
2 12
MGM/UA admitted that the initial authorization of the interna-
tional distribution occurred in the United States, 1 2 but they contended
that this authorization alone did not violate the U.S. copyright law.
21 3
MGM/UA requested a rehearing by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals en banc to consider whether Peter Starr conflicted with the
court's later decision in Lewis Galoob Toys in which the court did not
find a copyright infringement merely for facilitating an action which
would not itself violate the Copyright Act.21 4 If Lewis Galoob Toys
207. Id. at 1090.
208. Peter Starr Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir.
1986).
209. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1091 (citing Peter Starr, 783 F.2d 1440). In Peter
Starr, Twin Continental authorized illegal foreign distribution of a motion picture and
the authorization took place in the United States. Peter Starr appealed a district court
ruling that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction since the copyright infringement
occurred outside the United States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that,
although actions which take place entirely outside the United States cannot constitute
copyright violations, acts of authorization themselves can be copyright violations. Peter
Starr, 783 F.2d at 1441-43. Peter Starr is discussed in more detail in the Legal Back-
ground section of this note.
210. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1091-92.
211. Id. at 1092 n.2.
212. Id. at 1092.
213. Id. at 1093.
214. Id. at 1093. In Lewis Galoob Toys, the court refused to find a copyright
violation for authorizing another party to engage in an infringing act when the author-
ized use would not constitute a violation of the Copyright Act. Subafilms, at 1093,
citing Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1582 (1993). One of the judges on the Subafilms panel,
Judge Rymer, was also on the Lewis Galoob Toys panel. Lewis Galoob Toys is dis-
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controlled, MGM/UA could show that its authorization of the foreign
distribution was not a copyright violation because extraterritorial acts
are not protectible under U.S. copyright laws.
Subafilms lost the opportunity to get a holding on whether MGM/
UA's authorization included authorizing making a copy of the film
here in the U.S. (a clear violation of U.S. law). Subafilms did not make
that argument before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals
panel which heard the appeal prior to the en banc hearing. Subafilms'
contention about MGM's copying the negative in the United States
was also not supported by the record of the case.21 In reaching its
decision in Subafilms, the court accepted the admission that the initial
authorization occurred in the United States, but limited the acts of au-
thorization solely to entering into the licensing agreement rather than
also including copying the film's negative.216 As a result, the appeal
dealt only with acts of authorization occurring within the United States
and ignored the impact of also copying the film's negative within the
United States prior to unauthorized foreign distribution.
The court found that the 1976 Copyright Act requires proof of a
direct infringement before a party can be held liable for contributory
infringement.2 17 Authorization alone, without direct infringement
which violates the copyright law, is not enough to create a cause of
action. 218 To decide whether the direct infringement must take place
within the United States, the court considered the extraterritorial ap-
plication of other laws and concluded Congress legislates with an as-
sumption that its laws will not apply beyond the borders of the United
States.2" 9 Unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise, a law does not
apply to extraterritorial actions. As a result, before a party can be lia-
ble for authorizing a direct infringement, the direct infringement must
occur in the United States so it will be a violation of U.S. copyright
law. 220
D. The Legal Basis for the Subafilms Decision
The Subafilms court traced third party liability back to the 1909
Copyright Act and found that liability was predicated on the author-
cussed in more detail in the Legal Background section of this note.
215. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1092 n.3.
216. Id.
217. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093, 1107.
218. Id. at 1093.
219. Id. at 1093-94, 1112.
220. Id. at 1094.
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ized act itself being a copyright violation.22' Courts had not been con-
sistent, though, in the degree of involvement they required of the third
party before finding third party liability for copyright violations under
the 1909 Act.222 Determining the degree of involvement and nature of
the authorized act was at the heart of four recent Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decisions: Peter Starr, Lewis Galoob Toys, Columbia Pic-
tures Indus. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. ,228 and
Subafilms.
The Peter Starr court accepted, as does the Subafilms court, that
"infringing actions that take place entirely outside the United States
are not actionable. 12 4 However, the Peter Starr court held that au-
thorization within the United States was all that was needed to estab-
lish a cause of action under the Copyright Act.225 Since its ruling in
Peter Starr, however, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a party cannot
be liable as an infringer merely for authorizing actions which are not
proscribed by section 106 of the Copyright Act.22 This fine distinction
led to the dispute in Subafilms over whether the authorized action
merely had to violate section 106 of the Copyright Act (unauthorized
distribution) without actually creating a cause of action (since the dis-
tribution occurred entirely outside the United States).
The Subafilms court favorably cites Nimmer on Copyrights to
support its analysis of the type of action necessary to create a cause of
action for contributory infringement.2 27 Melville and David Nimmer
analyzed the Peter Starr decision in their Nimmer on Copyrights trea-
tise.228 They observe that a related defendant can be liable even if there
is no liability against the direct defendant, since the direct infringer
may not be subject to service of process or his identity may not even be
known.2 29 Nimmer finds a very different issue, though, when consider-
ing whether direct infringement must occur to create third party liabil-
221. Id. at 1099.
222. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1102 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 437-38 &n.18, and
Peter Starr, 783 F.2d at 1443).
223. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Professional Real Est. Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d
278 (9th Cir. 1989).
224. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1097 (citing Peter Starr, 783 F.2d at 1442 citing Rob-
ert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1976) cert. denied,
429 U.S. 848 (1976)).
225. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1094 (citing Peter Starr, 783 F.2d at 1442-43).
226. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1098 (citing Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 970).
227. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1098 (citing 3 Nimmer, supra note 46,
§ 12.04(A)(3)(a) at 12-80 n.82 (1991 ed.)).
228. 3 Nimmer, supra note 46, § 12.04(A)(3)(b) at 12-86 to 12-87.
229. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04(A)(3)(a) at 12-83.
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ity.230 The category of related, or third party, defendants comes from
the Copyright Act, which gives copyright owners "the exclusive right
'to authorize' various activities."I's The mere act of authorization is not
likely to harm the copyright owner, though, if there is no act of in-
fringement following the authorization." 2 Nimmer refers to the "undis-
puted axiom that United States copyright law has no extraterritorial
application" and concludes that "it would seem to follow necessarily
that a primary activity outside the ... United States," which would not
be actionable under the Copyright Act, cannot serve as the basis for
third party liability for related actions within the United States."'
Nimmer goes on to say that "the few cases that have addressed this
question reached the contrary result. 23 4
The Peter Starr court interpreted the addition of the words "to
authorize" in the Copyright Act of 1976 to create a cause of action for
contributory infringement even though the authorized actions took
place entirely outside the United States. 38 In contrast, the Lewis
Galoob Toys court concluded that the inclusion of the words "to au-
thorize" in the 1976 Copyright Act was "not meant to create a new
form of liability for 'authorization' that was divorced completely from
the legal consequences of authorized conduct, but was intended to in-
voke the preexisting doctrine of contributory infringement."23 6 The
Subafilms court agrees with the Lewis Galoob Toys court 237 and con-
cludes the addition of the words "to authorize" in the 1976 Copyright
Act merely clarifies that a contributory infringer only needs to be in-
volved in the direct infringement to the extent of authorizing the in-
fringing actions.23 8 It quotes the legislative history of the 1976 Copy-
right Act, which states the words were added to "avoid any questions
as to the liability of contributory infringers," to support their conclu-
sion that the primary infringement must be actionable under the copy-
right law before a third party can be liable for authorizing the primary
infringement.2 39
230. Id.
231. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04(A)(3)(a) at 12-83 (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 106).
232. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04(A)(3)(a) at 12-85.
233. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04(A)(3)(b) at 12-86.
234. 3 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04(A)(3)(b) at 12-87 (citing Peter Starr and
Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods, Inc., 672 F.Supp. 237 (W.D.N.C. 1987)).
235. Peter Starr, 783 F.2d at 1443.
236. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1092 (citing Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 970).
237. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1092.
238. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093.
239. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
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The reason for not finding primary infringement in Subafilms dif-
fers from the reasons in Lewis Galoob Toys and Columbia Pictures.240
In Lewis Galoob Toys, the allegation of primary infringement was
based on the creation of an illegal derivative work.24' The court failed
to find a derivative work, so there could be no primary infringement.
242
In Columbia Pictures, the alleged primary infringement was based on
unauthorized public showing of movies. The court held that hotel
guests watching movies in their rooms did not constitute public per-
formance under the Copyright Act, so there was no primary infringe-
ment.243 In Lewis Galoob Toys and Columbia Pictures, the alleged in-
fringing activity was found not to be infringing at all. On the other
hand, the alleged primary infringement in Subafilms was unauthorized
distribution of a motion picture.2 14 The Subafilms court concluded that
it cannot draw the line "between an act that does not violate a copy-
right because it is not the type of conduct proscribed by section 106 [of
the Copyright Act], and one that does not violate section 106 because
the illicit act occurs overseas." 2 "
The alleged primary infringement in Subafilms (unauthorized dis-
tribution) is clearly an infringing activity, but because infringement oc-
curred entirely abroad, MGM/Pathe can not be liable for contributory
infringement as a result of authorizing the foreign distribution. The
court, however, did not decide whether a third party can be liable for
contributory copyright infringement if primary infringement which is
actionable under U.S. copyright law is attempted but fails.2 6
The Subafilms court rejected Subafilms' interpretation of the Sec-
ond Circuit's doctrine that copyright laws can have extraterritorial ap-
plication " 'when the type of infringement permits further reproduction
abroad.' 2,147 The Subafilms court found the Second Circuit doctrine
only allows damages if the direct infringement occurs within the
United States.46 The doctrine had been applied in cases where the "in-
Sess. 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674).
240. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093.
241. Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 968.
242. Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 970.
243. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1092 (citing Columbia Pictures, 866 F.2d at 279-81).
244. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1090.
245. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1094 (citing Daniaq, S.A. v. MGM/UA Commun.
Co., 773 F.Supp. 194, 203 (C.D.Cal. 1991), affd on other grounds, 979 F.2d 772 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
246. Subafilms, 24 F.2d at 1094 n.8.
247. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ., Ltd.,
843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988)).
248. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1094 (citing Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly,
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fringing use would have been actionable even if the subsequent foreign
distribution that stemmed from that use never took place."2 "9 Conse-
quently, those cases were based on primary infringement which oc-
curred within the United States, not on contributory infringement for
actions occurring outside the United States. Since the direct infringe-
ment in Subafilms occurred outside the United States and only the au-
thorization occurred within the United States, this Second Circuit
Court of Appeals doctrine would not apply even if the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals were to adopt the doctrine.5
The Subafilms court also rejected Subafilms' contention that the
Copyright Act should extend to extraterritorial acts of infringements
when those acts have adverse results in the United States. " 1 The court,
instead, opted to uphold "eighty years of consistent jurisprudence on
the extraterritorial reach of the copyright laws without further guid-
ance from Congress. 2 52 Subafilms could still pursue breach of contract
remedies in United States courts if the statute of limitations has not
expired. 58 They may also be able to sue in United States courts for
violations of foreign copyright laws, although the jurisdictional issue is
not settled.2 54
When the Copyright Act was revised in 1976, Congress expanded
the extraterritorial application of the law to the unauthorized importa-
tion of copyrighted works when copies were lawfully made abroad.2 55
The 1909 Act only prohibited the importation of copies which were
unlawful in the foreign country in which they were made.25"6 The court
observes that Congress could have easily extended copyright protection
to infringing action which occurred abroad, 257 but they did not do so.
When the cause of action in Subafilms occurred (1987), the
United States was a member of the U.C.C.,2 " and in 1988, the United
530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976); Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390
(1940)).
249. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1094 (citing Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records,
Inc., 201 F.Supp. 560, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)).
250. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1094.
251. Id. at 1095.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1095 n.10.
254. Id. at 1095.
255. Id. at 1096.
256. Id. at 1096 n.ll (citing Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 30, 35 Stat. 1075,
1032 (1909)).
257. Id. at 1096.
258. Id. at 1097.
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States acceded to the Berne Convention . 5 9 As described earlier, both
the U.C.C. and Berne use national treatment for international copy-
right violations. A United States citizen receives the same protection as
a citizen of the country in which the violation occurred.2 60 The
Subafilms court expressed the opinion that national treatment of inter-
national copyright violations implies a "rule of territoriality," meaning
the law of the nation in which the violation occurred should be applied,
not the law of the country of the author's citizenship nor the country
where the work was first published.2 61
Congress believed that domestic industries that depend on copy-
rights can get adequate protection by relying on foreign copyright laws
for extraterritorial infringements, which was one reason Congress ac-
ceded to the Berne Convention.262 The Subafilms court interprets this
reasoning as further evidence that Congress wanted to have foreign
laws apply to copyright infringement cases when the alleged violation
occurs in another country.
The Subafilms court was concerned that extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. copyright law could cause difficult choice-of-law problems
since Berne does not require all countries to have identical copyright
laws.26 3 Since Congress recently expressed its desire to further the
copyright protection of U.S. works abroad through international agree-
ments, the court found it inconsistent to extend the extraterritorial
reach of the copyright law and find an actionable copyright violation in
this case.26 "
The Subafilms appeal turned on the issue of whether the unautho-
rized distribution of the movie outside the United States, when the au-
thorization was given in the United States, by itself creates a primary
infringement of U.S. copyright law which is necessary to allow a find-
ing of contributory infringement for the foreign distribution. The court
states that the judiciary should not act in a manner that could disrupt
attempts by Congress to stabilize international intellectual copyright
enforcement.26 5 "The application of American copyright law to acts of




262. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1095 (citing H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 18-20; S.Rep. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.,
3706, 3707-10)).




fect." 2" If the court applied U.S. copyright law in this case, it would
risk offending other Berne nations and displacing their laws in circum-
stances in which they had previously been applied. 267
The Subafilms court also observes that GATT uses the Berne
Convention as a model for its "TRIPS" agreement on intellectual prop-
erty protection. 68 Adhering to Berne "provide[d] a firm foundation for
the enactment of a more comprehensive agreement on intellectual prop-
erty protection through GATT. ' 269
The Subafilms court held that, under U.S. copyright law, a party
is only liable for copyright violation for authorizing an act if the au-
thorized act constitutes infringement which is prohibited under the
copyright law. As a result, authorizing an act which takes place en-
tirely outside the United States is not a copyright infringement.170 The
court "overrule[d] Peter Starr insofar as it held that allegations of an
authorization within the United States of infringing acts that take
place entirely abroad state a claim for infringement under the [Copy-
right] Act. 2 7 1
CONCLUSION
In Subafilms, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals backs away
from its prior decision granting some extraterritorial application to the
U.S. copyright law. The Subafilms decision is consistent with judicial
interpretation of the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws in other
cases. Courts consistently look for a clear indication of congressional
intent to have U.S. laws apply beyond our borders. In light of the final
passage of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade on Decem-
ber 1, 1994, the Subafilms decision is consistent with steps by Con-
gress to participate actively in international agreements to protect
works of U.S. citizens against infringement abroad rather than relying
on bilateral agreements.
It remains to be seen whether other Circuits will follow the 9th
Circuit's Subafilms decision. That decision seems consistent with a
move by Congress to rely on international treaties to protect United
States citizens' copyrights against international copyright infringement.
266. Id. at 1097.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1098 n.16. TRIPS stands for trade-related aspects of intellectual prop-
erty rights.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1099.
271. Id. at 1090.
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The international community will have a challenge keeping up with the
dramatic technological advances which are occurring.
Patricia Scahill
